



I provide counterexamples to Kit Fine’s semantics for imperative and deontic modals.
In particular, I argue that the semantics fails to provide necessary conditions for con-
junctive imperatives.
In a recent series of papers, Fine (2018a,b) has formalized a truthmaker semantics for
imperative and deontic logic. This system has quickly garnered substantial interest for a
number of reasons. It offers elegant resolutions to puzzles about deontic logic (in particular,
to Ross’s puzzle)—and, as one of the first applications of truthmaker semantics, functions
as a ‘proof of concept’ for a system with applications ranging from a theory of partial truth
(Fine (2013)), the is-ought gap (Fine (2018c)), natural language semantics (Moltmann
(2020)), epistemology (Elgin (2021a)), metaphysics (Elgin (2021b)) and the philosophy of
science (Elgin (2020)).
There are two central motivations behind a truthmaker semantics for imperatives. The
first is that the aspects of the world relevant to imperatives are actions, rather than out-
comes. The command ‘Raise your hand’ thus concerns the act of raising one’s hand—rather
than the global situation that would result from raising one’s hand. The second is that,
in the spirit of the truthmaker approach, compliance and contravention are taken to be
exact. An act which complies with the command ‘Shut the door’ is entirely relevant to the
command; no part of that act is irrelevant. Therefore, the act of both shutting the door and
opening the window does not comply with that command (though a part of that act—i.e.,
the part consisting of shutting the door—does comply with that command). As a result,
this approach is hyperintensional. While ‘Raise one hand’ may be logically equivalent to
‘Raise one or both hands,’ actions in compliance with the latter need not be in compliance
with the former and, for this reason, the imperatives mean different things. That is, while
the act of raising both hands complies with the latter imperative, it does not comply with
the former.
As is probably already clear, this approach assumes that acts are capable of mereological
composition; some acts are composed of others. To reuse a former example, the act of
shutting the door and opening the window may be the composite of two acts: the act of
shutting the door and the act of opening the window. To capture this structure within our
formalism, we may define an act-space as the ordered pair ă A,Ďą where A is a set of
acts, and Ď is a binary relation on A. ‘Ď’ is intended to be interpreted as the relation of
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(improper) parthood, so that ‘a Ď a1’ means that act a is a part of act a1. It is assumed
that parthood forms a partial ordering over acts, i.e., that Ď satisfies the following criteria:
Reflexivity: a Ď a
Antisymmetry: a Ď b ^ b Ď a Ñ a “ b
Transitivity: a Ď b ^ b Ď c Ñ a Ď c
As defined, many act-spaces are uninteresting. In some, no mereological composition
occurs at all; every act is a part of itself, and no act is a part of any other. Here, I will
restrict my attention to act-spaces that allow for arbitrary fusion; every collection of acts
within A has a fusion within A.1
To formalize a semantics, we require a language in which to express imperatives. Let
us adopt a simple propositional language L. Within L, there are infinitely many sentence
symbols, s1, s2, ..., the sentential operator # and the binary connectives ^,_—all defined
in the standard way.2
On some approaches, the aim of a semantics is to determine which worlds comply with
a given command. But on the truthmaker approach, the goal is to identify the acts within
a world that are in exact compliance with (or in exact contravention to) an imperative. It
is not assumed that each imperative has a unique act that complies with it. The command
‘Bring a raincoat or bring an umbrella’ presumably has (at least) two: the act of bringing
a raincoat and the act of bringing an umbrella.
Let a model M be an ordered triple ă A,Ď, | ¨ | ą such that ă A,Ďą is a (complete)
act-space and | ¨ | is a valuation functions that takes—as its input—a sentence symbol
and has—as its output—an ordered pair ă V, F ą where both V and F are subsets of
A—intuitively the acts in compliance with and the acts in contravention to the input
respectively. With the definition of a model in place, the semantics is given inductively.
1For finitely large act-spaces, this may be accomplished simply by assuming that every two acts within
A have a fusion within A. Defining a condition for infinitely large act-spaces requires a few more definitions.
Let an upper bound of B Ď A be an act a such that, for all acts b P B, b Ď a. That is to say, an upper
bound of a subset of A is an act which contains—as a part—every act within that subset.
Let a least upper bound of B Ď A be an act a such that a is an upper bound of B and, for all upper
bounds a1 of B, a Ď a1. Intuitively, we can think of the least upper bound of B as being the smallest upper
bound of B—one which is a part of all upper bounds of B. Provably, if there is a least upper bound of B,
then there is a unique least upper bound of B. Proof: For an act-space ă A,Ďą, select an arbitrary B Ď A.
Suppose, for reductio, that B has two least upper bounds—δT1 and δT2. From the definition of ‘least upper
bound’ we have that δT1 Ď δT2 and δT2 Ď δT1. Given antisymmetry, this entails that δT1 “ δT2.
I denote the least upper bound of B as δB—and identify the fusion of the elements of B with its least
upper bound. Let a ‘complete act-space’ be any act-act ă A,Ďą such that every B Ď A has a least upper
bound in A. Here, I am concerned only with complete act-spaces.
2Fine also includes a symbol J for top—which the null act complies with. I omit this additional
complication, as it is not relevant to the examples I am concerned with.
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i)` a , s iff a P |s|V
i)´ a - s iff a P |s|F
ii)` a , #A iff a - A
ii)´ a - #A iff a , A
iii)` a , A ^ B iff there exist acts a1, a2 such that a1 , A and a2 , B and a “ a1 \ a2
iii)´ a - A ^ B iff either a - A or a - B
iv)` a , A _ B iff either a , A or A , B
iv)´ a - A _ B iff there exist acts a1, a2 such that a1 - A and a2 - B and a “ a1 \ a2
With this semantics in place, we may define imperative entailment—the conditions in
which one imperative entails another. In particular, imperative A entails imperative B just
in case:
1q Every act that complies with A contains—as an improper part—an act in
compliance with B.
2q Every act that complies with B is an improper part of some act in
compliance with A.
For example, command A^B entails command A because every act in compliance with
the conjunctive command contains an act in compliance with each conjunct, and every
act in compliance with a conjunct is a part of an act that complies with the conjunction.
Relatedly, the command ##A entails the command A because any act which complies with
one also complies with the other.
This semantics has a number of virtues—the first of which is that it is extremely intu-
itive. An act complies with the command to #A just in case it contravenes the command
to A. So, if the act of not bringing dessert contravenes the command ‘Bring dessert,’ then
that act complies with the command ‘Do not bring dessert.’3 An act complies with the
command A^B just in case it is composed of two acts—one of which complies with A and
the other of which complies with B. So, an act complies with the command ‘Go to the bank
and go to the supermarket’ just in case it is composed of two acts—one of which complies
with ‘Go to the bank’ and the other of which complies with ‘Go to the supermarket.’ Acts
comply with the disjunctive command A _ B just in case they either comply with A or
comply with B. So, an act complies with ‘Go to the bank or go to the supermarket’ just in
case it either complies with ‘Go to the bank’ or it complies with ‘Go to the supermarket.’
Another virtue is that this resolves a longstanding puzzle about the logic of imperatives—
Ross’s puzzle. Assertoric sentences typically admit of disjunction introduction. The sen-
tence ‘John opened the window’ entails ‘Either John opened the window or John burned
down the building.’ But, intuitively, imperatives do not admit of disjunction introduction.
If John were told ‘Open the window,’ and inferred ‘Open the window or burn down the
3This example assumes that omissions count as acts.
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building,’ that would be in error. Fine’s semantic accommodates this result. Disjunction
introduction fails on this semantics; command A does not entail command A _ B because
there are acts in compliance with the disjunction (in particular, acts in compliance with B)
that are not part of acts in compliance with A. And, for this reason, the command ‘Open
the window’ does not entail ‘Open the window or burn down the building.’
Despite these virtues, I believe that Fine’s semantics is incorrect. In particular, there
are counterexamples to his semantics for conjunctive imperatives.4 Recall that—on this
semantics—an act a complies with the command A ^ B just in case it is the fusion of an
act that complies with the command A an act that complies with the command B. I do
not question this condition’s sufficiency, but rather its necessity. That is, I maintain that
there are acts that comply with the command A ^ B that are not composites of an act
that complies with A and one that complies with B. I will provide the general form of this
counterexample before describing a case I take to witness this form.
Suppose a person is issued a command A ^ B, and they perform two acts. The first of
these acts fully complies with the command to A and partially complies with the command
to B, while the second act finishes the compliance with the command to B. The fusion
of these acts, I maintain, complies with the command to A ^ B. Nevertheless, this fusion
is not the composite of an act that complies with A and an act which complies with B.
After all, on the truthmaker approach, compliance is taken to be exact; an act complies
with a command just in case it is entirely relevant to the command. The first act is thus
not in compliance with the command to A, because a part of that act is irrelevant to the
command to A—it is relevant to the command to B. And the second act does not comply
with B, as it only constitutes a partial compliance with B. And so, there are acts that
comply with conjunctive commands that are not fusions of acts in compliance with each
conjunct.
Here is such a case. Suppose there is a room with two empty beakers and two liquids—
Red and Blue. Jack sits in this room when Jill issues a command: “Fill one beaker with Red
and fill one beaker with Blue.” Jack sees that there is a jug filled with Blue, which he can
use to fill either beaker. He looks to his right and looks to his left. No Red jug. Fortunately,
he sees a button on the table. Pressing this button does two things (and nothing else). It
fills one of the beakers with Red and also fills half of the other beaker with Blue. Jack then
performs two acts: he presses the button—thereby filling one beaker with Red and half of
the other beaker with Blue—and pours Blue from the jug into the half-empty beaker. As
a result of these acts, one beaker is filled with Red and the other beaker is filled with Blue.
For the purposes of this example, let us denote Jill’s command “Fill one beaker with Red
and fill one beaker with Blue” as c, and let us denote the fusion of Jack’s acts of pressing
the button and pouring Blue into the half-empty beaker as a.
This example is used in the following argument against Fine’s semantics for conjunction:
4It is straightforward to use these types of cases to generate counterexamples to his semantics for acts
in contravention to disjunctive imperatives—as well as the semantics for conjunction and disjunction in
deontic logic. However, for the purposes of this paper I restrict myself to conjunctive imperatives.
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Assumption 1: Jack has complied with command c.
Assumption 2: If Jack has complied with command c, then Jack has complied with
command c by performing act a.
Therefore, Jack has complied with command c by performing act a.
Assumption 3: If Fine’s semantics is correct, then Jack has not complied with
command c by performing act a.
Therefore, Fine’s semantics is not correct.
This argument is incontrovertibly valid. Its tenability thus rests upon assumptions 1, 2
and 3. Let us take them in turn.
Assumption 1: Jack has complied with command c
The argument for this rests on the intuition that Jack has complied with c. When Jill
issued her command, the two beakers were empty. Jack then acted, after which one liquid
was filled with Red and the other was filled with Blue—precisely as Jill directed. That the
beakers were filled was no accident—the filling was directly caused by Jack’s acts.
There are a few ways to target this intuition. If Jill were to observe Jack push the button
and pour the jug—thereby filling one beaker with Red and the other with Blue—and then
ask “When will you comply with my command?” it would seem odd. If she were to berate
Jack for failing to comply with her command, it would seem unreasonable. In my mind,
this intuition is robust, and I will take it as given; Jack has complied with command c.
Assumption 2: If Jack has complied with command c, then Jack has
complied with command c by performing act a.
Suppose that Jack has complied with command c. Then, there must exist some act of
Jack’s which is in compliance with c. The reason to believe assumption 2 is that there is
no act other than a which Jack performs which plausibly complies with c.
If we knew nothing of Jack’s acts except that he performed act a, we could infer that he
had complied with c; we need not search the room for other beakers which Jack has filled
in order to determine whether he has complied with Jill’s command. Therefore, either act
a or one of its parts must be in compliance with c.
The only proper parts of act a are the acts of pushing the button and the act of topping-
up the half empty beaker. Neither of these acts is in compliance with c. The act of pushing
the button did not comply with c—because c requires that one liquid be filled with Blue
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and, after the push of a button, a beaker was only half-filled with Blue. The act of topping
up the beaker does not itself comply with c, as it does nothing to ensure that the other
beaker is filled with Red. Only the fusion of these acts—the act of pushing the button and
the act of topping up the beaker—ensures that Jack has complied with Jill’s command c.
And so, if Jack has complied with Jill’s command c, then Jack has complied with Jill’s
command c by performing act a.
Assumption 3: If Fine’s semantics is correct, then Jack has not complied
with command c by performing act a.
According to Fine’s semantics, an act complies with the command A ^ B just in case it
is composed of two acts—one of which complies with A and the other of which complies
with B. If act a complies with command c, then a must be composed of one act which
complies with the command “Fill one beaker with Red” and another which complies with
the command “Fill one beaker with Blue.”
But act a is not composed of an acts which comply with these conjuncts. The act of
pushing the button is neither in compliance with “Fill one beaker with Red” nor “Fill one
beaker with Blue.” This act exceeds one which is in exact compliance with “Fill one beaker
with Red”—because it partially fills a beaker with Blue. This is irrelevant to the command
“Fill one beaker with Red”, and acts that comply with commands are entirely relevant to
those commands on the truthmaker approach. And because half of a beaker is left unfilled
with Blue, it also does not comply with “Fill one beaker with Blue” (because acts that
comply with commands guarantee that the command has been complied with). Similarly,
the act of pouring the Blue jug neither exactly complies with “Fill one beaker with Red”
nor “Fill one beaker with Blue.” This act does nothing to ensure that a beaker is filled with
Red, and only goes partway toward ensuring that a beaker is filled with Blue.5
Act a is thus not composed of two acts—one of which complies with “Fill one beaker
with Red” and the other of which complies with “Fill one beaker with Blue.” On Fine’s
semantics, this means that act a does not comply with command c. Therefore, if Fine’s
semantics is correct, then Jack has not complied with Jill’s command c by performing act
a. It follows from assumptions 1, 2 and 3 that Fine’s semantics is incorrect. In particular,
his semantics for conjunctive imperatives fails.
I close by noting that this type of example threatens not only Fine’s truthmaker seman-
tics for conjunction, but the exact approach to imperatives quite generally. For, suppose
that Jill had merely issued the command “Fill a beaker with Red,” and Jack had responded
by pushing the button—thereby filling one beaker with Red and half of the other beaker
with Blue. Intuitively, Jack has complied with that command; his act resulted in a beaker
being filled with Red. Nevertheless, the act of pushing the button is not in exact compli-
5Act a itself neither complies with the command “Fill one beaker with Red” nor “Fill one beaker with
blue.” It exceeds an act which complies with the former command because it fills a beaker with Blue, and
exceeds the latter command because it fills a beaker with Red.
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ance with Jill’s command. After all, this act partially filled a beaker with Blue—which is
irrelevant to the command. And there seems no plausible part of Jack’s act that is in exact
compliance with her command—as it cannot be separated into parts, one of which concerns
filling a beaker with Red and the other with partially filling a beaker with Blue. And
so, Jack has complied with Jill’s command without performing an act in exact compliance
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